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Abstract. We present an empirical and large-scale analysis of malware samples
captured from two different enterprises from 2017 to early 2018. Particularly, we
perform threat vector, social-engineering, vulnerability and time-series analysis
on our dataset. Unlike existingmalware studies, our analysis is specifically focused
on the recent enterprise malware samples. First of all, based on our analysis on the
combined datasets of two enterprises, our results confirm the general consensus
that AV-only solutions are not enough for real-time defenses in enterprise settings
because on average 40% of the malware samples, when first appeared, are not
detected by most AVs on VirusTotal or not uploaded to VT at all (i.e., never seen
in the wild yet). Moreover, our analysis also shows that enterprise users transfer
documents more than executables and other types of files. Therefore, attackers
embed malicious codes into documents to download and install the actual mali-
cious payload instead of sending malicious payload directly or using vulnerability
exploits. Moreover, we also found that financial matters (e.g., purchase orders and
invoices) are still the most common subject seen in Business Email Compromise
(BEC) scams that aim to trick employees. Finally, based on our analysis on the
timestamps of captured malware samples, we found that 93% of the malware
samples were delivered on weekdays. Our further analysis also showed that while
the malware samples that require user interaction such as macro-based malware
samples have been captured during the working hours of the employees, the mas-
sive malware attacks are triggered during the off-times of the employees to be able
to silently spread over the networks.
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1 Introduction
Despite its ever-evolving nature, malware still is the most frequently encountered cyber
threat in the world [6], severely impacting both enterprise and home networks. The
damage caused may vary depending on the type of malware and digital assets accessible
on the victim’s network. Generally, a user has one or a few devices connected to home
network, while the number of systems connected to an enterprise network can vary
from hundreds to thousands with a variety of security policies in place. This complexity
of the enterprise networks brings new challenges for securing valuable assets on such
networks.
Reports [8] show that enterprise and home users are exposed to different types of
attacks because of their distinct day-to-day usage patterns. Therefore, attacks may also
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differ from each other in several ways. First, since attacks on enterprise networks can be
very profitable, attackers can be extra motivated to use more sophisticated, advanced,
and persistent methods (i.e., targeted attacks). Second, since enterprises prefer defense-
in-depth approaches, which pose some restrictions on the use of the Internet and email
for personal purposes, enterprise users may face less number of attacks but a wider
variety of malware threats than the personal computer users [8]. Last but not least, as
the attack surface is much larger on enterprise networks, with one insecure vector on the
network (e.g., a misconfigured router), attackers can access the data of multiple users,
and potentially stay undetected for longer periods of time.
Even though malware detection is a well-studied topic in the literature, only a few
works [20,19,23,24] have focused on malware samples encountered in real-world enter-
prises. These studies analyze security logs in order to extract intelligence on malware
discovered in a specific enterprise. In anotherwork [18], suspicious emails andmalicious
attachments were examined. Compared to these studies, in this work, we analyze the
samples captured on-site inside two different enterprises, i.e., not only email attachments
but also file downloads. Our work aims to shed some light on what kind of malware is
seen in typical, high-profile enterprises today, what the infection vectors look like, and
what trends do attacks follow.
In this study, we have access to a dataset of≈ 3.6 million samples collected from two
enterprises from 2017 to early 2018 (we call OrganizationA andOrganizationB to avoid
disclosing their identity and security weaknesses). Particularly, all the file downloads
and email attachments of the employers from two high-profile, global enterprises are
collected and analyzed. Among all the samples, only 2,942 of them have been detected
as malicious, and among malicious samples, the dataset includes 122 unique samples
that have never been seen in the wild (i.e., not on VirusTotal (VT)), even as of the writing
of this paper3.
Moreover, this dataset has several unique features that other studies in literature do
not have:
1. The samples are captured on-site inside companies.Previous studies in the literature
ofmalware research use datasets ofmalware that were captured in thewild, or shared
by AV companies. Hence, the malware being analyzed does not have any context
for how and when the infection took place. However, our dataset has been captured
through the sensors deployed on the real-world networks of two enterprises.
2. Both the behavioral analysis andVirus Total (VT) reports have been obtained during
both the time of capture (i.e., just after the sample has been captured). To the best
of our knowledge, we are not aware of any study using such a unique dataset.
3. The samples are analyzed using an advanced behavioral analysis module that we
have access to4 This module is able to detect 2,920 different malicious activities of
themalicious samples and the list is always updatedwith newly discoveredmalicious
behaviors.
We leverage this dataset to perform the empirical analysis of malware samples
collected from two organizations. We characterize our analysis under five categories.
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4 We explain the details of the analysis module in Section 3.
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– Overall characteristics analysis: In this, we analyze the overall statistics of both
benign and malicious files in the dataset to understand the characteristics of files
received and sent by enterprise employers during their daily routines.
– Threat vector analysis: In this, we analyze the document types of malware used as
a threat vector to infect the enterprise networks in our study.
– Social-engineering analysis: In this, we analyze the file names of the malware, and
the content of the malware instances to understand how users are motivated to click
on the malicious artifact.
– Vulnerability analysis: In this, we analyze the samples that have been labeled with
a CVE number in terms of their distribution over time.
– Time-series analysis: In this, we analyze the distribution of malicious samples over
time to understand the logic behind the time management of attackers.
1. On average, one out of two malicious samples in our dataset were not detected by
AVs on VT while almost one out of five malicious samples were not found on VT
during the time of capture of the sample.
2. Documents are the most frequently used file types in both enterprises with the fre-
quency of 72% and 36%, respectively for Enterprise-A and Enterprise-B. However,
our further threat vector analysis showed that the file type distribution of malicious
files is same as all files. While the most malicious file types are documents, ex-
ecutable and jar are the most common two file types used in malicious samples
received in Enterprise B.
3. Our threat vector analysis showed that 34% of all malware samples are received in
the format of jar and those malware samples are labeled as being part of massive
phishing email campaigns by both AVs, and the dynamic analysis module we had
access to.
4. Our social-engineering analysis showed that 51% of the malicious documents are
related to a financial matter (e.g., purchase order, invoice) noting that financial
subjects are the most used subjects in BEC scams. However, contrary to reports [6],
we also found that 23% of all document-basedmalware samples are organizational-
looking (e.g., attached CV) files.
5. Our vulnerability analysis revealed that 80% of the malware samples exploiting any
CVE vulnerability are using the CVEs released in the year of 2017. This shows that
attackers follow recent exploits, and use them more than they use older exploits. We
also verified other works [18] that all of the samples utilizing an exploit has been
captured after their publish date.
6. Finally, our time-series analysis revealed that as one would expect, the number of
received malware during the work hours is a lot more than those captured during
off times – assuming that the employees work from 8 am to 5 pm during weekdays.
In contrast, there have been reports [9,13] that have shown that some large-scale,
non-human interaction requiring attacks occurred during the weekend.
2 Scope, Dataset, & Privacy
In this section, we explain the scope of the paper and the characteristics of our dataset.
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Organization Time interval # Samples Malicious samples (%)
A Jan 2017 - Feb 2018 3,192,452 243 (0.008 %)
B Feb 2017 - Jan 2018 463,476 2,699 (0.582 %)
Total Jan 2017 - Feb 2018 3,655,928 2,942 (0.081 %)
Table 1. Summary of our dataset collected from two different organizations.
2.1 Scope
Enterprise malware is not well-studied in literature because gaining access to malware
samples captured by enterprises is generally difficult. However, understanding the nature
of the threats that enterprise users have been exposed to during their daily works is
important as such threats may result in catastrophic outcomes.
Compared to home users, as a part of their daily work, the enterprise users receive
and send a lot more files, especially documents. Email is the most common way of
communicating and transferring files, which makes it also the most common threat
vector [5,2]. However, other than allowing us to have access to email attachments and
file downloads, our dataset does not include information related to the infection vector.
That is, we do not have access to the contents of the emails, email headers (e.g., from, to,
subject), or security logs inside the enterprise. Clearly, such information would greatly
help to an analysis like ours in this work, but such information is typically difficult to
acquire because of privacy concerns.
2.2 Dataset
Every file downloaded, including email attachments from two enterprises during one
year, have been captured through the sensors deployed at the organizations. Sensors
scan the incoming and outgoing network traffic, the traffic within the network, as well
as the host activity on the network. As the sensors are directly installed on end-users’
systems, they have access to the unencrypted payload. Samples are sent to the back-end
of the security company that we gained access to, and all the samples are analyzed in an
isolated sandbox during the time of the capture.
Our dataset includes reports of both benign andmalicious samples, which are indexed
based on their hashes and as well as the rawmalicious files. Moreover, we have access to
reports generated at different times. Both behavioral analysis results and VT results of
all files have been generated at the instant of the capture.Moreover, since VT results may
change over time, we also checked the VT results during the time of the experiment.5
Particularly, the dataset includes the analysis result of ≈ 3.65 million samples (3.2M
fromA and 450K from B), which have been captured from two organizations, namely A
and B6, starting from January 2017 to February 2018. The maliciousness occurrences
of samples collected from A is 0.582 %, i.e., almost every 6 files out of a thousand files
an employee in the organization works on are malicious, and it is much less than 1 in a
5 July 2018
6 For privacy reasons, we do not disclose the company names.
An Analysis of Malware Trends in Enterprise Networks
thousand in organization B. As we mentioned earlier, we also have the raw binaries of
2940 malicious samples. In the following sections, we analyze the characteristics of the
malicious samples in more detail. Table 1 is the summary of main characteristics of our
dataset.
1. Behavioral analysis results:
(a) Metadata
i. Timestamp
ii. Hash (i.e., SHA1)
iii. File type
iv. Mime type
(b) The list of malicious behaviors
2. VT results
(a) VT result (e.g., detection ratio, label) at the instant of the capture
(b) VT result during the time of the experiment7
3. Malicious raw binaries
2.3 Privacy
Note that even though we have the privilege of having a unique, real-world attack
datasets from two high-profile organizations, due to privacy policies, our analysis has
some limitations. In particular, we could not correlate the captured data, and some
features that are unique to the enterprises (e.g., such as the industrial sector that they are
active in).
3 Analysis of Samples
In this section, we explain our analysis methods, results and labeling procedure. Partic-
ularly, we used two types of analysis results to label the samples: An advanced Dynamic
Analysis (DA) module that was provided to us, and VirusTotal (VT).
Dynamic Analysis module reports. The DAmodule is an advanced malware detection
and analysismodule that runs the samples in a sandbox andmonitors their behaviors. It is
capable of running the sample in an appropriate environment for different file types. For
example, if the sample is an executable or document file (e.g., word, pdf), it is directly
run in the proper OS (e.g., Windows) environment and its behaviors are monitored.
However, if it is, for example, an archive file (e.g., zip, jar), it will be decompressed
first, and then executed. In addition, if it is an HTML or URL type of sample, it will be
executed in an instrumented or emulated browser. A malware sample, sometimes, can
run inside more than one environment. For example, a JavaScript file can be executed by
loading it in a browser as well as run directly on the operating system. While the sample
reveals malicious behavior in an environment, it may not reveal in another environment.
In total, 2,920 different malicious sub-behaviors under 35 total categories (e.g., evasion,
packer, macro, signature) are extracted. A sample is tested against all these malicious
behaviors. If the sample shows a particular malicious behavior, that specific behavior
7 July 2018
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VT positives
D
A
m
o
d
u
le Malicious(>3) Benign(<=3) NotFound
Malicious(>70) 1 -Malicious (2,685) 2 -Suspicious (128) 3 -Malicious (127)
Suspicious([30,70]) 7 -Malicious (128) 8 -Suspicious (449) 9 -Suspicious (92)
Benign(<30) 4 -Suspicious (285) 5 -Benign (∼3.6 M) 6 -Benign (20,628)
Table 2.Ground truth labeling strategy. DA score has been obtained through the dynamic analysis
module and VT positives is the number of AV detection of the given sample on VT.
has been added to the report. The report includes all of the malicious behaviors that
have been revealed by the sample. A sample report that is generated after monitoring
the behaviors of the sample is given in Appendix A.
After acquiring the reports of malicious behaviors and sub-behaviors, in order to
classify the sample, every malicious behavior category (e.g., evasion, packer) is con-
verted into a boolean value according to the detection of the malicious sub-behavior
from that category. After that, every value is multiplied with its unique weight and
summed. The final result is called a “score”. If the score of a sample is less than 30, it
is labeled as benign. If it is larger than 70, the sample is labeled as malicious. Samples
with a score between 30 and 70 are labeled as suspicious. Note that we improve this
simple classification by re-labeling the samples using the strategy in Table 2.
VirusTotal reports.We also checked the analysis results of the samples on VT. As our
dataset is dominated by the samples labeled as benign by our DA module, the number
of benign samples with 0 score are 99.8% (≈ 3.65M) of all samples. Therefore, we
randomly selected a subset of benign samples, and checked those samples on VT. We
observed that none are on VT – hence, not detected by AVs. However, we also checked
all other 19,867 unique samples with any type of malicious behavior (i.e., score> 0)
detected by our dynamic analysis on VT. In order to avoid false positives of VT, we
chose the threshold detection number of 3 [21]. That is, if a sample is detected by more
than 3 AVs on VT, we say that the sample is labeled as malicious by VT. Otherwise, it
is labeled as benign by VT.
Ground truth. In order to obtain a ground truth for the labels of the samples in our
dataset, we use both the reports generated by the DA module and VT. Even though
there is a consensus on some of the files, there are also inconsistencies between the DA
module and VT. We follow the strategy in Table 2 in order to re-label the samples. In
particular, if labels from both the dynamic analysis engine and VT match ( 1 and 5 ),
the sample is labeled with the result of both tests, while if they contradict each other ( 2
and 4 ), we label them as suspicious. Moreover, not all of the samples were found on
VT, where we had only DA module reports. For those ( 3 and 6 ), if it is not labeled
suspicious (i.e., the score is not in [30, 70]) by the DA module, we labeled that sample
with the result of that one report. Finally, if the sample is labeled by the DA module as
suspicious, and found malicious by VT ( 7 ), we label it as malicious. However, if there
is no consensus between the DA module and VT, we label it as suspicious. 8 and 9
are labeled as suspicious because either there are not enough reports, or the samples are
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Organization Class AV label
AV detection
during the
time of capture
As of analysis
(7/24/2018)
A and B Malicious Undetected 1,318 (47.7%) 121 (4.4%)
A and B Malicious Unclassified 514 (18.6%) 122 (4.4%)
Table 3. Number of unique unclassified and undetected malware samples.
not exhibiting enough malicious behavior. The analysis of suspicious files has been left
as a future work as the scope of this paper is to characterize the malicious files.
At the end of this labeling procedure, we classified every sample as either malicious,
suspicious, or benign. In total, we have ≈ 3.6M benign, 3,767 suspicious, and 2,940
malicious samples. Note that in this classification, we used the most recent reports
generated by VT, where we have also the VT reports generated during the time of
capture.
4 Results
In this section, we present the results from a more detailed analysis and share our
findings and insights. First, we analyze the overall characteristics of the dataset. Second,
we analyze the file types of malicious samples to understand the threat landscape and
infection vectors used in attacks. Third, we investigate the malicious documents in detail
to understand the social-engineering techniques used to trick users. Fourth, we study
the exploits and the corresponding CVEs found in our dataset. Finally, we compare the
data from two organizations and discover the commonalities and differences from the
time-series distribution of malware samples.
4.1 Overall Characteristics Analysis
Unique Malicious Samples. We obtained the hashes of 2,940 malware samples. We
observed 2,766 unique samples in total. These samples were checked on VirusTotal
(VT) both at the time of capture and at the time of this analysis. We call a sample: (1)
unclassified if it is not found on VT; (2) undetected if it is found on VT and detected by
fewer than 3 anti-virus software (AV) on VT. We found that, at the time of capture, a
small fraction of the unique samples already existed on VT and were detected by AVs;
47.7% of them existed on VT but were not detected by AVs (i.e., undetected); 18.6%
of them had never been submitted to VT (i.e., unclassified). It is worth noting that AVs
on VT are regularly updated with signatures of newly discovered malware. We found
that the numbers of undetected and unclassified samples drop significantly months later
at the time of this analysis. We also observed that most of those unclassified samples
are in the format of the document. This result underlines the delayed detection by AVs
and thus the unsuitability of AVs for immediate detection of malware attacks at their
onset. Table 3 shows the sample counts and percentages of undetected and unclassified
samples at the two different times.
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Summary of findings-1: As shown in Table 3, at the capture time, almost one out of
two malicious samples (1,318/2,763) in our dataset were not detected by AVs; almost
one out of five malicious samples (514/2,763) had not been submitted to VT. This
shows the ineffectiveness of the AVs in real-time malware detection. However, AVs can
still be useful as the first line of defense in the defense-in-depth solutions deployed in
enterprises, in order to quickly filter out the previously discovered/reported malware
samples. Moreover, we also found that AVs evolve over time by adding more samples
to their database. The percentage of both undetected and unclassified samples dropped
to 4.4% at the time of this analysis (i.e., months after the initial malware captures).
However, there were still 121 unique malicious samples undetected by AVs and 122
unique samples never submitted to VT at that time. Note that unclassified and undetected
files refer to different files, so in total, we can interpret it as 243 files can not be detected
by AVs. Moreover, we also note that as we did not perform analysis on historical VT
reports.
Fig. 1. File type distribution among all samples (≈ 3.65 M samples), including both benign and
malicious samples from Organization A and B. The figure shows that documents (e.g., doc, pdf)
are the most common file types observed in enterprise networks whereas the executable file types
are a lot less common.
File type distribution. The types of samples are detected and reported by the DAmod-
ule. Figure 1 shows the distribution of file types among all the samples in OrganizationA
and B. Themost common file type used in both A and B is a document, as expected, with
frequencies of 73% and 36% for organizations A and B, respectively. Since the number
of benign samples is a lot more than the number of malicious samples, the distribution is
dominated by benign samples. However, as this is also known to attackers, they can use
documents to carry or hide a malicious payload in order to bypass detection heuristics
based on file types. Moreover, it is also interesting to see that scripts such as JavaScript
or PowerShell scripts are commonly used in these organizations for benign purposes.
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Although we have no visibility into what exactly scripts are used for, we can reasonably
expect that may serve the purpose of automating workflows.We expect that the attackers
may increasingly utilize scripts in order to infect enterprise computers and networks.
Finally, we also observed that executable are much less common (respectively 1% 4%
for A and B) than document-based samples. Therefore, considering that malicious pay-
loads often exist in the form executables, it is more likely for executables propagated in
company networks, especially from untrusted sources, to be malicious than documents.
Fig. 2. Top-10 malware types in our dataset, where trojan is the most common malware type for
both A and B. Moreover, downloaders are a lot more common than exploits, which shows that
attackers prefers simpler methods like macro-based malwares over more advanced vulnerabilities.
Malware type distribution. In order to better understand the threat landscape in
organizations, we also analyzed the types of malware samples in our dataset. The
distribution of malware types observed in A and B is illustrated in Figure 2.
We used the malware labels reported by the DA module. If a sample was undetected
and unclassified by the DA module, we fetched the most recent labels from VT. We
note that a sample often has different labels assigned by different AVs on VT and many
of them tend to use overly generic labels (e.g., trojan). We picked more specific and
descriptive labels, such as those from Microsoft and Kaspersky.
Summary of findings-2:The top-10malware types in our dataset are shown in Figure 2.
The most common malware type in our dataset is trojan for both A and B. Trojan is
a generic name and mostly used for labeling samples that are not associated with any
malware family or do not contain enough malware family information. Therefore, as
expected, the number of trojan samples is more than other types in both A and B. In the
second place, we see the downloaders, counting for 17% and 20% of malware found in
A and B, respectively. The downloaders are usually embedded to documents and infect
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the system by downloading and installingmoremalware at a later stage of infection. This
hidden malware is more difficult to catch due to their limited and conditional exposure.
Therefore, themethods based only on static analysis are not able to extract these samples,
echoing the need for combining both static and dynamic analysis for malware discovery.
The fourth in both Organization A and B is exploit, meaning that samples showing the
behavior of a publicly disclosed CVE. As shown in Figure 2 compared to downloaders
and trojans, we observe that both organizations receive less number of exploits. This
result matches the findings reported by some security companies [11,2]. It shows that
the attackers are more often using simple methods (e.g., embedding malware using
document macros) than employing advanced vulnerabilities. This is because the former
is much less complex to carry out than the latter while still yielding good results on
unwary or security-unconscious users in enterprises.
Fig. 3. The number of malicious samples captured per day. On average, A received 0.6 malicious
and 8K benign samples per day while B received 7.7 malicious and 1300 benign samples.
Averagemalware counts per day. Weanalyzed how the capture/appearance ofmalware
varies over time and if it exhibits any patterns. Figure 3 shows the number of malicious
samples captured per day in our dataset during the course of a year (Jan. 2017 to Jan.
2018).
Summaryof findings-3.According to Figure 3, the number ofmalicious samples per day
varies in the range from 0 to 8 for Organization A throughout the whole period whereas
the same number fluctuates significantly and topped at 40 per day for Organization B.
On average, A received 0.6 malicious and 8K benign samples (downloads and email
attachments) per day while B received 7.7 malicious and 1,300 benign samples per day.
B has seen 80 times more malicious samples than A. This discrepancy indicates that
the risks of attacks and malware infection can vary a lot across different organizations
and industry sectors, revealing attacks being driven by nature and potential value of the
target businesses. Moreover, we tried to identify the cause to the spikes in Figure 3. But
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we could not find any major security events or reports for those dates. We suspect that
the spikes were resulted from some hidden attacks targeting that particular organization
or sector.
4.2 Threat Vector Analysis
Attackers use not only executable files but also other types of files such as MS office
documents (e.g. docx, xlsx) or archive files (e.g., jar, zip) to spread malware. Using
documents, the attackers can embed the malicious code and run within a document
itself. This embedding can happen in the form of, for instance, macros in MS Office
documents and JavaScript (JS) in pdf files. Since MS Office 2016, macros have been
disabled by default in documents [10]. Similarly, JS code has been disabled by default in
PDF readers. Therefore, unlike executables, the malicious code does not execute in the
first place when a user opens the document. Instead, the user is asked to "enable active
content". To adapt to such security countermeasures, attackers now try to convince users
to enable the macros and scripts using social-engineering techniques, e.g., showing
images with fake warnings for users to "Enable content". When accompanied by very
convincing messages or emails, users may easily fall for these tricks. Once the macros
have been enabled, the embeddedmalicious code is triggered,which goes on to download
and run the actual malware or full malicious payload. Moreover, Java (jar) archive files
have been widely used and have seen a surge in recent malicious email campaigns [3],
where themalicious payload is compressed (zip or rar) and attached to the email. This file
format is preferred by the attackers as it is relatively less-known file type for malicious
files. Plus, it benefits from the cross-platform nature of Java. In addition to macros and
JS, we also observed other types of scripts. For example, PowerShell scripts have been
used to infect Windows PC. In Figure 4, we plot the 10 most malicious file types used
in A and B, among which 6 are common between A and B.
Fig. 4.Most malicious file types in A and B, where 6 of them are common.
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Summary of findings-4. Figure 1 shows that 73% and 36% of the files observed on
the company networks are document-based files, compared to only 1% and 4% for
executable files, for A and B, respectively. We found that Java archive files are the
most common file type used in malware samples targeting B while executable files are
the most common for A. Both types of files require manual actions to be triggered.
Malware written in Java can run on any platform that has JVM (Java Virtual Machine)
installed, i.e., does not require the knowledge of the system that the victim is using.
Therefore, they are highly preferred for phishing email campaigns. We also saw the
samples of commercial RAT (Remote Access Trojan), such as Jrat, Adwind, Jaraut. For
B, we observed that 34% of all malware samples are jar files and we also saw that all
of the Java malware samples are labeled as part of phishing email campaigns by AVs.
Therefore, one can reasonably suspect that the list of emails of A may have been leaked
to attackers. Moreover, our results confirm the findings of the other reports [11,2] that
document-based malicious files are still highly preferred by attackers as they are often
considered safe by the average users.
1. Malicious file is received 2. Content is enabled 
by the user
3. Macro or JS code 
is executed
4. Malicious payload is 
downloaded and installed
Fig. 5. Infection chain of a sample document-based malware.
4.3 Social-engineering analysis
According to recent reports published by Microsoft [8], there is a recent transition from
exploits to macro-based malware to infect endpoints. In our dataset, we observed 1,370
malicious documents while there is only 158 samples associated with a publicly known
vulnerability. Even thoughmacros have been disabled by default since 2016, it continues
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to be a common threat vector formassive pishing campaigns like Locky, Cerber [7]. This
still poses threats mainly because people fall victim to social engineering tricks, and in
turn, grant permissions to malicious samples. Therefore, it is important to understand
and prevent social-engineering techniques used by the attackers.
What happens if a user is tricked to enable themacros or JavaScript in pdf documents?
In order to find out, we also run the samples in an isolated environment and observed
their behaviors. Figure 5 shows the infection chain of document-basedmalware samples.
Malicious documents are usually received as an attachment to emails, which direct users
to enable dynamic content or scripts. When a user does so, the code runs, downloads
the actual malicious payload, and then installs it on the victim’s system.
Method. In order to understand the social-engineering techniques used by attackers,
we performed the following analysis. First, we analyzed the file names of the samples
when received by the victim. Since the samples in our dataset were renamed using their
hash values, we fetched the original filenames of the documents from the VirusTotal’s
database. Second, we also analyzed the subject of the document as inferred from file
names and actual file content. Based on inferred subjects, we categorized all the doc-
uments into several categories. We observed that some of the samples only include
"content enable" images and do not have a meaningful file name. We categorized them
as No-content files.
Fig. 6. Distribution of the subject in malicious documents. 51% (313/615) of the malicious
documents Organization B received have been shown as related to a financial matter, while it is
hard to comment on Organization A, as it has a very limited number of samples (36 samples.)
Summary of findings-5. The subject distribution is shown in Figure 6. 51% (313/615)
of the malicious documents Organization B received have been shown as related to
a financial matter, which is similar to the results reported by Symantec [12] showing
that financial subjects are the most used in business email compromise (BEC) scams.
However, unreported in [11], we found that 23%of all document-basedmalware pretends
to be usual business files of various kinds. For example, emails related procurement
orders and resumes are highly common in the malicious documents found in B. In
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order to better understand the techniques used by attackers, we also analyzed the file
subject in more details and plotted the counts for each subject word (Figure 7). The
most commonly used keyword is "resume", accompanied by a name (e.g., "Rebecca-
Resume.doc"). Other commonly used phrases are mostly related to finance such as
"order", "invoice", or "payment". Moreover, their acronyms like "PO", "RTQ", "INV"
etc. are also mostly preferred to trick the victim.
Fig. 7. The top 10 keywords used in file name of the document-based malwares.
4.4 Vulnerability Analysis
Newly discovered and reported vulnerabilities in software are assigned an ID, called
CVE, as a uniform reference among vendors and security researchers. If AVs detect
that a malicious sample exploits a vulnerability, it labels the sample with its publicly
known CVE ID. In this section, we share the details about the vulnerabilities found in
the samples and their characteristics.
Method. In order to tag the malware samples with a CVE identifier, we used three
sources. The first one is our DA module. It matches the vulnerability behavior with the
malware’s behavior i.e., if the particular behavior is observed, the sample is labeled
with the given CVE instead of malware type related to that behavior. Second, we used
the labels provided by Microsoft and Kaspersky on VT. We observed 158 samples in
total that use at least one vulnerability with a CVE. We observed a discrepancy between
the samples labeled by them. For instance, five samples are tagged as the exploit of
CVE-2014-1761 by Kaspersky and as CVE-2012-0158 by Microsoft. We counted those
samples twice, which does not affect the overall results much due to the small numbers
of such cases.
Summary of findings-6. Table 4 shows the list of nine CVEs found in our dataset.
Publish date, affected product, and vulnerability type are taken from [4]. First seen on
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CVE ID Publish Date First seen on VT Capture Time Count Affected product Vulnerability Type AV detection ratio
2010-3333 2010-11-09 2017-05-09 2017-05-09 2 MS Office Remote Code Execution 30/56
2012-0158 2012-04-10 2017-03-22 2017-03-22 22 MS Office Remote Code Execution 32/58
2014-1761 2014-03-25 2017-08-21 2017-08-21 5 MS Office Memory corruption 30/59
2015-1641 2015-04-14 2017-10-04 2017-10-10 5 MS Office Memory corruption 31/59
2015-2545 2015-09-08 2017-09-08 2017-09-08 1 MS Office Remote Code Execution 27/59
2017-0199 2017-04-12 2017-05-23 2017-05-23 64 MS Office Remote Code Execution 31/58
2017-8570 2017-07-11 2017-08-30 2017-08-30 6 MS Office Remote Code Execution 29/60
2017-8759 2017-09-12 2017-09-14 2017-09-19 33 MS .NET Framework Remote Code Execution 27/59
2017-11882 2017-11-14 2017-11-22 2017-11-22 23 MS Office Memory corruption 33/59
Table 4. List of CVEs in our dataset. Publish Date, Affected product, and Vulnerability Type are
taken from [4]. First seen on VT and Capture Time are the respective dates for the first sample in
our dataset. AV detection ratio is the average detection ratio of all samples tagged with a specific
CVE ID.
Fig. 8. Distribution of CVEs in our dataset over time. The size of the circle is proportional with
the sample count at that time interval.
VT and capture time are the respective dates for the first sample in our dataset. AV
detection ratio is the average detection ratio of all samples tagged with a specific CVE
ID. As shown in Table 4, 80% of the exploits are targeting the CVEs released in the
year of 2017. This shows that attackers tend to use recent exploits for better results.
This is because many systems now automatically patch known vulnerabilities within
a short window (e.g., a few months). The chances for a successful exploit is higher if
more recent vulnerabilities are targeted than older vulnerabilities. This also shows that
attackers are fast in following and leveraging new CVEs.
Moreover, we also saw that malware using CVE-2017-8759 appeared only two days
after its release date. The first sample exploiting CVE-2017-8570 was captured 50 days
after its public release. In general, we observed that a sample exploiting a vulnerability
can be seen in the wild after a period of a few months or even just days since the
vulnerability disclosure. Therefore, it is important to patch vulnerabilities as soon as
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possible. On the other hand, when we analyzed the samples for Organization B, we saw
that on average, B received the samples exploiting vulnerabilities three months after
their disclosure dates.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of exploits in our dataset over time in terms of their
captured dates and initial disclosure dates. In a similar work [18], it was shown that
none of the exploits were used before their public disclosure. We also verify that all of
the samples utilizing an exploit were been captured after the CVE disclosure dates.
Fig. 9. Number of malware received per the days of the week.
Fig. 10. Number of malware received per hours of the day.
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4.5 Time Series Analysis of Malicious Samples
Attackers use many different techniques to trick users. Some of these tricks depend on
proper timing. For example, employees may receive the malicious samples at a certain
time of the day, or specifically on some days. In this section, we analyze these timing-
related factors from the victim’s perspective. We use the capture time of the malicious
samples in our time series analysis.
Working hours vs. Off-times. According to the reports [1], the largest number of
security threats are detected on weekdays, i.e., when employees are working on their
computers. In order to verify if this pattern exists in our dataset, we plot the distribution
of malicious samples frequency for each day of the week in Figure 10 and for each hour
during the day in Figure 9.
Summary of findings-7. Based on Figure 9 and 10, the number of received malware
during the work hours is a lot bigger than that number for off-hours, assuming employees
work from 8 am to 5 pm on weekdays. However, there are also reports [9] and some
massive attacks [13] contradicting with our finding. Especially, the attacks utilizing a
vulnerability prefer weekends as they may want to spread over the network without
being detected. However, the malware that require to be enabled by the victim are going
to prefer working hours.
5 Related Work
Malware detection has been an active research area for years. There have been numerous
studies [14,15,22,16] working with large-scale malware dataset with the sizes of the
datasets changing from a hundred thousand to millions and on different problems such
as detection, clustering, indexing, etc. In all these studies, the samples captured different
sources and were brought together for evaluating the proposed method, or collected in
the wild, where the target entity is unknown. However, in practice, while it is known
that home and enterprise users are known to have different threat landscapes, it is not
clear if different enterprises actually have been targeted by different types of threats. In
our study, we perform an analysis of such a dataset and provide the characterization of
malicious samples captured from two different enterprises.
Enterprisemalwaredetection. In the literature, there are only a fewworks [20,19,23,24,17]
about enterprise malware. All of these studies analyze security logs in order to extract
some intelligence related to malware encounters occurred in a specific enterprise. In
another work [18], the authors analyze suspicious email collected from two members of
an NGO, where both the content of the emails, and malicious email attachments were
used for the analysis. Compared to the datasets used in these studies, our dataset was
collected from specific commercial enterprises from 2017 to early 2018 and the samples
were analyzed during the capture time with both a DA analysis module as well as VT.
Note that to date, there have not been many scientific works that have reported on what
kind of malware high-profile organizations are faced on a daily basis. In this paper, we
aim to bridge that gap.
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6 Conclusion
In this work, we presented an analysis of malware samples captured from two different
enterprises from 2017 to early 2018. First, as one would expect, our analysis on the
combined dataset showed that only-AV solutions are not effective in real-time defense
because on average, 40% of the malware samples were either not detected at all, or have
never been seen in the wild yet during the incident. Second, as employees in a typical
enterprise work with more documents than executables, attackers mostly use documents
as an attack vector. Hence, frameworks that allow the processing of documents in the
cloud would provide better protection against many such attacks. In our vulnerability
analysis, we also found that attackers use recently disclosed CVEs more than older dis-
closures. Additionally, after our social-engineering analysis, we also found that financial
issues are still the most common subject used in social-engineering attacks against the
enterprises that we analyzed.
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A A sample malicious behaviours report generated by the DA
module
The list of malicious behaviours extracted via the DA module from a given sample:
"Anomaly: Found suspicious security descriptors for lowering the integrity level",
"Autostart: Registering for autostart during Windows boot",
"Evasion: Potentially malicious application/program",
"Evasion: Potentially malicious application/program (MMX stalling code detected)",
"Evasion: Targeting anti-analysis/reverse engineering",
"Evasion: Trying to enumerate security products installed on the system from WMI",
"Execution: Anomalous execution of VBScript file",
"Execution: Attempt to download / exec with javascript / vbscript code",
"Family: EICAR test sample",
"Packer: Potentially unwanted application/program (VMProtect)",
"Steal: Targeting Firefox Browser Password",
"Steal: Targeting Internet Explorer Browser Password",
"Steal: Targeting Opera Browser Password",
"Steal: Targeting Outlook Mail Password",
"Steal: Targeting Windows Saved Credential",
"Stealth: Creating executables masquerading as browser clients",
"Stealth: Creating executables masquerading as files from a Java installation",
"Stealth: Creating hidden executable files",
"Stealth: Modifying attributes to hide files"
B Massive malware attacks in our dataset
The following is the list of most frequently captured malware samples in our dataset.
Attack Type A-count B-count Infection What it does
Donoff Downloader 28 445 Email downloads Cerber
Skeeyah Trojan 55 207 Email opens a backdoor
Tiggre Trojan 13 120 Malicious website mines cryptocurrency
Madeba Trojan 1 89 Email downloads another malware
Dynamer Trojan 56 103 Dropped by other malware downloads another malware
Fareit Spyware 39 87 Dropped by other malware steals sensitive information
Bluteal Trojan 0 45 Dropped by other malware gives remote access
Occamy Trojan 2 37 Dropped by other malware steals sensitive information
Locky Ransomware 0 31 Email encrypts files
Nemucod Ransomware 38 45 Email encrypts files
Table 5.Massive malware attacks in our dataset.
